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The effect of multiple directorships on real and accrual-based 
earnings management: evidence from Saudi listed firms 
Abstract: 
Purpose - The study examines the effect of multiple directorships on accrual-based earnings 
management and real earnings management. It analyses whether earnings management 
practices in the Saudi context increase or decrease with the average number of multiple 
directorships.  
Design/methodology/approach – The study uses Roychowdhury (2006)’s approach to 
capture the level of real earnings management and employs Jones (1991)’s cross-sectional 
model to measure accrual-based earnings management.  
Findings – The paper provides partial evidence supporting the “busyness” hypothesis where 
earnings management practices increase with the number of multiple directorships. The 
evidence shows that multiple directorships have a positive and significant effect on real 
earnings management in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, we find no significant 
impact of multiple directorships on accrual-based earnings management.  
Originality/value – This is the first study that empirically investigates the relationship 
between multiple directorships and earnings management in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
The paper contributes to the limited literature on multiple directorships in developing 
countries by examining their impact on opportunistic real earnings management. 
Keywords: Accrual-based earnings management; real earnings management; Saudi Arabia; 
multiple directorships; busyness hypothesis; reputation hypothesis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There is an extensive academic research that examines the importance of corporate 
governance in constraining accrual-based earnings management in the U.S. and other 
developed countries (e.g., Alves, 2014; Bédard et al. 2004; Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011; 
Davidson et al. 2005; Garven, 2009; Osma and Noguer, 2007; Park and Shin, 2004; Peasnell 
et al. 2005; Xie et al. 2003; Yang and Krishnan, 2005), as well as in developing countries (e.g., 
Ab Razak and Palahuddin, 2014; Banderlipe, 2009; Hasan et al. 2014; Mansor et al. 2013; 
Mohamad et al. 2012; Sáenz González and García-Meca 2014; Saleh et al. 2005; Siregar and 
Utama, 2008; Uwuigbe et al. 2014; Waweru and Riro, 2013). These studies, however, do not 
consider the role of multiple directorships; i.e. they ignore the fact that directors can sit on 
more than one board in multiple firms.  
In addition, limited studies (e.g., Banderlipe, 2009; Mansor et al. 2013; Saleh et al. 2005) 
consider the impact of multiple directorships on accrual-based earnings management; but 
these studies do not consider the possibility that managers engage in real earnings 
management. Goh et al. (2013, p. 28) argue that “real earnings management is a more serious 
issue than accruals-based earnings management because the former affects a firm’s 
fundamental performance”. Moreover, Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005, p. 1115) criticize 
studies that ignore real earnings management and argue that these studies “may overestimate 
the impact of various institutional safeguards to control earnings management”. This study 
attempts to fill the gap in the corporate governance and earnings management literature by 
empirically examining the impact of multiple directorships on earnings management and, 
more precisely, on both real and accrual-based earnings management activities. 
There are two theoretical hypotheses relating multiple directorships to earnings management. 
The busyness hypothesis posits that directors holding multiple directorships will have 
insufficient time to monitor the firm's managers (Core et al. 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; 
Morck et al. 1988). From this point of view, earnings management should be positively 
associated with the average number of additional directorships held by board members. On 
the other hand, the reputational hypothesis argues that the number of additional directorships 
is an indicator of the directors’ reputation and expertise in dealing with financial reporting 
issues (Bédard et al. 2004; Shivdasani, 1993; Yang and Krishnan, 2005). From this point of 
view, it is expected that earnings management will decrease when the average number of 
additional directorships held by the directors of the firm is higher. The net effect of multiple 
directorships on real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management is, 
therefore, an empirical issue.  
One of the most important methodological issues involved in the study of multiple 
directorships is to measure this variable with a sufficient degree of accuracy. Prior research 
uses dummy variables to capture multiple directorships. For example, Banderlipe (2009) 
measures multiple directorships as a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has at least one 
independent director who holds three or more outside directorial positions and zero if 
otherwise. Mansor et al. (2013) use a dummy variable that takes a value of one for companies 
that do not have multiple directorships, and zero otherwise. Moreover, Saleh et al. (2005, p. 
90) measure multiple directorships as the ratio of members on the board with multiple 
directorships (more than two directorships) to total members and they argue that:  
“We do not use a more precise measure such as the average number of directorship held by 
the members because the information may not be appropriately disclosed. Thus, we have 
doubt about the completeness of the data.” 
We are motivated to examine the association between multiple directorships and the practice 
of earnings management in Saudi listed firms by two important reasons.  
First, a survey of the existing literature on real earnings management reveals that, with the 
exception of few studies (e.g., Tabassum et al. 2014, Zamri et al. 2013, Zgarni et al. 2012 and 
Zgarni et al. 2014), the existing research is predominantly US based. In Saudi Arabia, there is 
limited research on this area. While there is research on accrual-based earnings management 
(e.g., Al-Abbas, 2009; Moghaiwli, 2010), there is no research on real earnings management in 
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi institutional setting provides a unique context for this research issue. 
The corporate governance code was issued by the Capital Market Authority in 2006 and 
amended in 2010 in order to regulate and develop the Saudi capital market and increase the 
credibility and transparency of financial reporting (Al-Matari et al., 2012). Graham et al. 
(2005) and Cohen et al. (2008) document that U.S. firms switch from accrual-based earnings 
management to real earnings management after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
suggesting that firms are more likely to engage in real earnings management when corporate 
governance is strengthened and less flexible financial reporting standards are applied. Our 
study is carried out after the code of corporate governance became a compulsory regulation in 
2010. This environment provides incentives for the management to engage in real earnings 
management. Accordingly, we ask: does the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
earnings management practices, documented in previous Saudi studies, persist when 
considering real earnings management as the dependent variable?     
Secondly, by focusing on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, we study a developing country 
paying a particular attention to the issue of multiple directorships. The corporate governance 
code (article 12, h) states that for a member of the Board of Directors, the maximum number 
of directorships is five in five Joint-Stock Companies. However, the maximum number of 
directorships that a director can hold in the boards of non-Joint-Stock companies is not 
mentioned anywhere in the Saudi laws. A study conducted in the Saudi context seems to be 
crucial, in order to study the ability of directors with multiple board appointments to constrain 
managers’ opportunistic behavior effectively and to monitor earnings management activities. 
In our empirical tests, we use three real earnings management measures, as developed in prior 
research (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006, Cohen et al. 2008; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zamri et al. 
2013; Achleitner et al. 2014; Sun et al. 2014): (1) abnormal cash flows from operations, (2) 
abnormal discretionary expenses, and (3) abnormal production costs. In addition, following 
Braam et al. (2015), we construct three aggregated measures of real earnings management by 
combining the three aforementioned individual measures. We use the cross-sectional Jones 
model (1991) which has been used in other studies such as Baxter and Cotter (2009) and 
Roychowdhury (2006) to capture accrual-based earnings management. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Saudi 
code of corporate governance. Section 3 reviews the relevant literature and presents our 
predictions. Section 4 presents the sample selection and the empirical models. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.   
2. Corporate governance in Saudi Arabia 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia issued its own code on corporate governance in 2006, which 
was amended in 2010. The corporate governance code aims to ensure the protection of 
shareholders’ rights as well as the rights of stakeholders.  
Saudi Arabian companies have a unitary board system in which board members are appointed 
by the general assembly. The Board of Directors includes executive, non-executive and 
independent members. According to the code of corporate governance (article 12), the 
Chairman of the Board of Directors is not allowed to occupy any other executive position in 
the company. This means that CEO duality does not exist in Saudi Arabia. The number of 
board members should not be less than three (3) and more than eleven (11) as stated in article 
12 of the Code (2006, p. 13): “The Articles of Association of the company shall specify the 
number of the Board of Directors members, provided that such number shall not be less than 
three and not more than eleven”.  
Regarding the independence of the board of directors, the Saudi Code of Corporate 
Governance establishes that the number of independent board members shall not be less than 
two members, or one-third of the members, whichever is greater. The number of non-
executive directors must represent the majority of the members of the Board of Directors.  
Articles 14 and 15 of the code provide detailed rules for the formation of Nomination and 
Remuneration Committees and Audit Committees. The establishment of these committees is 
mandatory for all listed companies. It is worth mentioning that there is no legal requirement 
for the implementation of Executives committees.  
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Earnings management 
The accounting literature distinguishes between two types of earnings management. The first 
type, accounting earnings management, refers to “the interpretation of accounting standards 
and their application to transactions and events that have already occurred” as defined by 
Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005, p. 1104). Examples of accounting earnings management 
include the selection of accounting methods such as the depreciation or pricing of inventory. 
The second type, real earnings management, is defined “as departures from normal 
operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some stakeholders 
into believing that certain financial reporting goals have been met in the normal course of 
operations” (Roychowdhury, 2006, p. 337).  
Similarly to Roychowdhury (2006), Zang (2012, p. 676) states that real earnings management 
is “a purposeful action to alter reported earnings in a particular direction, which is achieved 
by changing the timing or structuring of an operation, investment, or financing transaction, 
and which has suboptimal business consequences”. Under these definitions, real earnings 
management is used opportunistically by firms' managers for their own private benefits rather 
than for the benefits of the company’s stockholders.  
Prior literature documents that each type of earnings management has its associated benefits 
and costs. The cost of real earnings management is that it has a significant negative impact on 
a firm's future performance. Tabassum et al. (2014) investigate the impact of real earnings 
management on future financial performance. Based on a sample of manufacturing firms in 
Pakistan over the period of 2004 to 2011, they document evidence that firms engaged in real 
earnings management through through abnormal production costs face lower financial 
performance in subsequent years. The benefit is that real earnings management is hard to 
detect (Manowan and Lin, 2013). For accounting earnings management, the benefit is that it 
has no direct effect on cash flows. The cost is that this type of earnings management is more 
likely to draw auditor and regulatory scrutiny (Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Roychowdhury, 
2006). Manowan and Lin (2013, p.89) state that real earnings management is more difficult to 
be detected by auditors compared to accrual-based earnings management, because the former 
manifests from managers’ real economic actions while the latter can be detected by examining 
a firm’s accounting policies. Chi et al. (2011) examine whether firms resort to real earnings 
management when their ability to manage accruals is constrained by higher quality auditors. 
The empirical results show that city-level auditor industry expertise, audit fees and Big N 
auditors are associated with higher levels of real earnings management.  
3.2. Earnings management in Saudi Arabia  
Saudi studies on earnings management focus on one earnings management technique in 
isolation and provide mixed evidence on the impact of corporate governance on accrual-based 
earnings management. For example, Al-Moghaiwli (2010) provides evidence of the practice 
of deliberate earnings management on the part of managers in Saudi Arabia. The empirical 
analysis is carried out using a sample of 46 companies listed on the Saudi Stock Market over 
the period 2005-2007, using multivariate statistical analysis. He finds that managers of large 
Saudi-listed companies which have high ratio of foreign employees to total employees tend to 
manage earnings through discretionary accruals to avoid potential political costs. Al-Abbas 
(2009) examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings 
management in the Saudi business environment, utilizing a sample of Joint-Stock companies 
for the period from 2005 to 2007. He measures earnings management by using current 
abnormal accruals. His results provide no evidence that corporate governance mechanisms 
mitigate earnings management. Alghamdi (2012) investigates to what extent corporate 
governance and external audit can affect earnings management practices. The expectation of 
beneficial corporate governance practices and external audit constraining opportunistic 
earnings management activities is, to a large extent, found to be inaccurate. No internal 
corporate governance variables, apart from outside director, board size and board meetings, 
examined in Alghamdi (2012)’s research are shown to have any significant effect on earnings 
management. A recent study by Habbash (2013) finds that some corporate governance 
attributes, namely board size and independence, are negatively and significantly associated 
with earnings management measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. His 
study covers a period from 2006 to 2009. It is important to note that none of these studies 
attempts to distinguish between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings 
management. This is not surprising, as real earnings management is hard to distinguish from 
normal business activities. According to Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005, p. 1115), “ignoring 
real earnings management may have an effect on the estimation of (accounting) earnings 
management, because most discretionary accruals models use variables whose values may be 
affected by real earnings management”. Our study is different from the above-mentioned ones 
in various respects; first, these studies provide evidence of a relationship between corporate 
governance characteristics and accrual-based earnings management. However, whether this 
relationship extends to a more costly earnings management technique (i.e. real earnings 
management) remains a critical question that this paper seeks to address. Second, this study is 
more concerned with the effect of multiple directorships on real and accrual earnings 
management rather than the relationship between board characteristics and discretionary 
accruals. Finally, unlike Alghamdi (2012) and Habbash (2013), who examine a sample prior 
to 2010, we focus on the period following the amendment of the corporate governance 
regulations.  
3.3. Multiple directorships and earnings management: Busyness versus Reputational 
Hypotheses 
Fama (1980) argue that the market for managerial labor provides incentives for directors to be 
good monitors of the firm’s management. The reward is the offer of additional directorial 
positions on other firms’ board. Therefore, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Vafeas (1999) use the 
number of directorships per board member as a proxy of the reputation of a director in 
monitoring managers. Saleh et al. (2005) find in their empirical study that multiple 
directorships factor is negatively related to earnings management only in firms with negative 
unmanaged earnings. Yang and Krishnan (2005) find that the number of outside directorships 
held by audit committee directors is negatively associated with earnings management 
behavior. The findings of Banderlipe (2009) in the Philippines context are also supportive of a 
negative association between multiple directorial positions and earnings management. 
However, other research does not support the negative relationship between the number of 
external appointments held by corporate directors and earnings management suggested above. 
Several studies, e.g. Morck et al. (1988), note a decreasing monitoring effectiveness of board 
members when they are busy with high additional directorships. In line with this argument, 
the Saudi code of corporate governance (2006) states that for a member of the board of 
directors of one firm, the maximum number of directorial positions is five in joint stock 
companies. Mansor et al. (2013) suggest that non-multiple directorships serve as an important 
corporate governance mechanism that could assist in overcoming the problem of earnings 
management. Sarkar et al. (2008) find that boards that have directors with multiple 
appointments exhibit higher earnings management. Garven (2009) and Sun et al. (2014) show 
that audit committees with high additional directorships are less effective in constraining real 
earnings management. 
In addition, the empirical findings regarding the effect of multiple directorships on earnings 
management are mixed. The overall impact of multiple directorships on earnings management 
becomes an empirical issue. 
4. Research methodology 
4.1. Sample selection and data collection procedures 
The sample used in this study covers four years from 2010 to 2013. The choice of this period 
is based on the fact that the Saudi corporate governance code has been amended in 2010. 
Detailed information on corporate governance and firm characteristics variables are collected 
by hand from annual report and corporate governance report. These reports are available on 
the Saudi Arabia stock exchange (Tadawul) website at http://www.tadawul.com.sa. 
We exclude the following sectors from our analysis: (1) Banks and Financial Services and (2) 
Insurance because the finance industry is a highly regulated industry and the behavior of 
earnings in the finance sector is different from other sectors (Mohamad et al., 2012). 
Consistent with Cohen and Zarowin (2010), we require at least 8 observations for each 
industry-year group. At the time of sampling, 121 non-financial companies are listed on Saudi 
Arabia stock exchange but after imposing all data requirements; the final sample consists of 
95 individual firms over the period 2010-2013, including 7 industries (see Appendix).  
4.2. Definition and measurement of dependent and independent variables 
Dependent variables 
Measures of real earnings management 
Following prior studies (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen and Zarowin, 2010; Zgarni et al., 
2012; Manowan and Lin, 2013; Zamri et al., 2013; Sun et al., 2014; Braam et al. 2015), the 
current study employs three metrics to study the level of real earnings management, namely 
the abnormal levels of cash flow from operations (RM_CFO), production costs (RM_PROD) 
and discretionary expenses (RM_DISX).  
Consistent with Roychowdhury (2006), the study estimates the abnormal level of each method 
of real earnings management as the residual from the corresponding estimation model. 
Manowan and Lin (2013, p.88) define sales manipulation as managers’ attempts to 
temporarily increase sales during the year through increased price discounts or more lenient 
credit terms. These lead to lower cash inflow over the life of the sales as long as suppliers to 
the firm do not offer matching discounts or lenient credit terms on firm inputs. We run the 
following cross-sectional regression for every industry and year in order to estimate the 
normal level of cash flow from operations:  
CFOit / Ait-1 = β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit /Ait-1] + β3 [∆Salesit /Ait-1] + εit  
Where,  
CFOit          Cash flow from operation of firm i in period t  
Ait-1                 Total assets of firm i in year t-1 
 Salesit         Sales of firm i in year t  
∆Salesit        Sales of firm i in year t less sales of firm i in year t-1 
εit                 A residual term that captures the level of abnormal cash flow (RM_CFO) of firm 
i in year t. 
 For the sake of convenience and uniformity, RM_CFO is multiplied by negative one (so that 
the higher the value of this variable, the higher will be the value of real earnings management 
through sales manipulation) and called this variable RM_CFO (R).  
The second type of real earnings management is the reduction of discretionary expenditures. 
Reduction of discretionary expenditures means that managers reduce discretionary 
expenditures such as advertising expenses, R&D expenses, and selling, general and 
administrative expenses to increase earnings (Sun et al., 2014, p. 160). We use 
Roychowdhury's (2006) model to estimate the normal of discretionary expenses: 
DISEXPit/Ait-1 = β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit-1 /Ait-1] + εit 
 Where,  
DISEXPit   The sum of Selling and Marketing Expenses and General and Administrative 
Expenses of firm i in year t 
Ait-1                   Total assets of firm i in year t-1 
Salesit-1        Sales of firm i in year t-1  
εit                 A residual term that captures the level of abnormal discretionary expenses 
(RM_DISX) of firm i in year t. 
For the sake of convenience and uniformity, RM_DISX is multiplied by negative one (so that 
the higher the value of this variable, the higher will be the value of real earnings management 
through reduction of discretionary expenses) and called this variable RM_DISX (R). 
Another type of real earnings management is to produce more units of goods than necessary 
to meet expected demand. We run the following model cross-sectional regression for every 
industry and year to compute abnormal production costs:  
PRODit/Ait-1 = β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit /Ait-1] + β3 [∆Salesit /Ait-1] + β4 [∆Salesit-1 /Ait-1] + εit  
Where,  
PRODit        The sum of cost of goods sold and change in inventory of firm i in year t  
Salesit            Sales of firm i in year t 
∆Salesit        Sales of firm i in year t less sales of firm i in year t-1 
∆Salesit-1        Sales of firm i in year t-1 less sales of firm i in year t-2 
Ait-1                   Total assets of firm i in year t-1 
εit              A residual term that captures the level of abnormal production costs (RM_PROD) 
of firm i in year t. 
We use three aggregate measures of real earnings management in this study. First, consistent 
with Cohen and Zarowin (2010) and Braam et al. (2015), we define an aggregate measure of 
real earnings management, RM_CD, which is computed as the sum of the standardized 
variables of RM_CFO and RM_DISX multiplied by negative one. Second, consistent with 
Cohen and Zarowin (2010), Zang (2012) and Braam et al. (2015), we define an aggregate 
measure of real earnings management, RM_PD, which is computed as the sum of the 
standardized variable of RM_PROD and the standardized variable of RM_DISX multiplied 
by negative one. Third, consistent with Cohen et al. (2008) and Braam et al. (2015), we define 
an aggregate measure of real earnings management, RM_CPD, which is computed as the sum 
of the standardized variable of RM_PROD and the standardized variables of RM_CFO and 
RM_DISX multiplied by negative one. The higher the value of each of the three aggregate 
measures, the more likely the firm is engaged in real earnings management. 
Measurement of accrual-based earnings management 
To measure accrual-based earnings management, the following cross-sectional model was 
proposed by  Jones (1991) and then used by Roychowdhury (2006), Zang (2012), Saleh et al. 
(2007) and Bédard et al. (2004), 
TACCit / Ait - 1 = α0 + α1 (1/Ait - 1) + β1 (ΔSit /At - 1)  +  β2 (PPEit/Ait - 1) +  εit  
Where,  
TACCit    is total accruals of firm i in year t. Total accruals are computed as net income minus 
operating cash flows; 
ΔSit             change in net sales for firm i between year t–1 and t; 
PPEit        gross property, plant, and equipment for firm i in year t; 
 εit                 A residual term that captures the level of accrual-based earnings management of 
firm i in year t. 
By estimating this model for each industry for each industry-year grouping, residuals 
(RES_ACC) are taken as level of accrual-based earnings management. 
Independent variables and control variables 
Following Ferris et al. (2003), our independent variable is the number of directorships per 
director (NDIR), calculated as the total number of other directorships divided by the total 
number of directors on the board.  
In our multiple regression analysis, we control for a large set of other corporate governance 
and firm characteristics’ variables that, as suggested by prior literature, potentially affect 
earnings management. These control variables include board independence (Osma, 2008; 
Alves, 2014), the number of board meetings (Xie et al., 2003), board size (Uwuigbe et al., 
2014; Kang and Kim, 2012), audit committee size and the number of audit committee 
meetings (Lin and Hwang, 2010). We include another control variable in the regression model 
that relates to the existence of an executive committee. We are aware that there is only one 
study by Xie et al. (2003) that examined the role of Executive committees in constraining 
earnings management. They argue that the Executive Committee plays an indirect role in 
controlling earnings management as it can dictate what is seen by the whole board of directors.   
Their study reveals that the composition of the Executive committee is associated with the 
level of earnings management and thereby may allow a committee to better perform oversight 
functions.  
In Saudi Arabian firms, the executive committee generally provides recommendations to the 
Board of Directors with regard to different subjects such as strategic and business 
plans. Moreover, the Board may delegate certain of its authorities and responsibilities to the 
Executive committee. The existence of an Executive committee should help the Board of 
Directors to monitor management’s behavior.   
We also control for the following variables identified in the existing earnings management 
literature (e.g. Zamri et al., 2013; Ye, 2014): return on assets, firm size and leverage.  
4.3. Regression model 
We test the association between the dependent variables of earnings management and the 
independent variables of corporate governance characteristics by estimating the following 
seven regression model: 
EMit = a0 + a1NDIRit + a2INDit + a3BSIZEit + a4NUMBBMEETit + a5ACSIZEit  
            +   a6NUMACMEETit + a7EXECCOMit + a8SIZEit + a9ROAit + a10LEVit 
                + εit      
 
Where: 
a0: intercept; 
a1 – a10: coefficients of slope parameters;  
Dependent variables: 
EM: RM_CFO (R), RM_DISX (R), RM_PROD, RES_ACC, RM_CD, RM_PD, RM_CPD 
(all the variables are as previously defined and this model is separately tested); 
Independent variables: 
NDIR: The total number of other directorships divided by the total number of directors on the 
board; 
Control variables: 
BSIZE: The number of directors in the board; 
NUMBBMEET: The number of board meetings held annually by the board of directors; 
IND: The ratio between the number of independent directors and the total number of board 
members; 
EXECCOM: A dummy variable that takes the value of one if an executive committee exists; 
and zero otherwise; 
SIZE: The natural logarithm of total assets at year-end; 
ROA: Net income divided by lagged total assets; 
LEV: Total long-term debt divided by total assets.  
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive analysis and correlations 
Table (1) shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this paper. Table (1) shows 
that each director held an average of one board seat on other listed companies. The maximum 
number of directorships on other boards is four seats. These results show that that the Saudi 
firms met the requirement made by the corporate governance code on the maximum on the 
maximum number of multiple directorships, which are five directorships on joint stock 
companies. The number of directors on the board is made of an average of eight directors. 
Independent non-executive directors account for more than a third (48%) of the total number 
of directors. Also, having an approximate mean value of about 57% for EXECCOM basically 
reveals that the majority of the Saudi firms have an executive committee.   
An examination of the correlation matrix, shown in table (2) indicates that all correlation 
coefficients are less than 0.80, suggesting that multicollinearity does not constitute a major 
concern (Gujarati, 2003). Table (2) shows that there are some significant correlations among 
independent and control variables. The highest correlation is between SIZE and LEV is 0.621 
(p<0.01), suggesting that larger firms have higher debt levels. The correlation between SIZE 
and NDIR is also significant (with correlation coefficient 0.225), suggesting that larger firms 
have more directors with high number of multiple directorships. 
5.2. Estimation models 
Table (3) reports the regression coefficients for the regression models used to estimate normal 
levels of cash flow from operations, discretionary expenses and production costs. The table 
reports the mean coefficients across industry-years and t-statistics from standard errors across 
industry-years. The explanatory power of the models is quite high. The average adjusted R2 
across industry-year is 89% for production costs and 50% for cash flows from operations. The 
mean adjusted R-square across industry-years is 33% for the model to predict normal level of 
accruals. 
5.3. Main regression results 
Table (4) displays the results of the regression equation models which were run using four 
OLS regression models which were employed using three individual proxies of real earnings 
management (RM_CFO (R), RM_DISX (R), and RM_PROD), and abnormal discretionary 
accruals, the measure of accrual-based earnings management as dependent variables. 
We find a significant positive coefficient of 0.031 (t=3.29) on NDIR in the RM_CFO (R) 
regression, suggesting that multiple directorships are associated with more real earnings 
management through sales manipulation. Consistent with the RM_CFO (R) results, we find a 
positive coefficient of 0.024 (t=2.57) on NDIR in the RM_PROD regression. This result 
implies that there is a significant positive relationship between multiple directorships and real 
earnings management through overproduction for the sampled firms in Saudi Arabia.  That is, 
the higher the number of directorial positions a board member has, the greater the level of real 
earnings management. 
Although the coefficients on NDIR in the RM_ DISX (R) and RES_ACC are insignificant at 
conventional significance levels, their signs are consistent with the busyness hypothesis’s 
predictions. 
Table (5) presents the estimation results using three different aggregate measures of real 
earnings management as dependent variables. Recall that a higher value of each of these 
aggregate measures implies more real earnings management. Since the results for the three 
models are quite analogous, we discuss them simultaneously. In the three models, the 
coefficient on the number of directorships per director is positive and significant at least at the 
10% level. 
Collectively, these results suggest that when directors are busy with multiple directorships, 
they are less likely to monitor managers and to limit their earnings management behavior. 
These results are consistent with the findings of Mansor et al. (2013), Sarkar et al. (2008), and 
Garven (2009) who opine that busy directors are less effective monitors and therefore provide 
managers with incentives to engage in earnings management. This outcome, however, 
contradicts Saleh et al. (2005), Yang and Krishnan (2005), and Banderlipe (2009) who argue 
that directors with multiple board seats tend to be effective monitors of management, and 
therefore will limit earnings management practices. 
As to the control variables, the coefficient on audit committee meetings is significantly 
negative in three specifications (see table 4, column 3, and table 5, columns 2 and 3). This 
suggests that audit committees that meet frequently are associated with more effective 
monitoring of management and are more likely to limit earnings management. This is 
consistent with the findings of Xie et al. (2003). The results in Tables 4-5 suggest that in most 
cases we find support for a negative and significant relationship between earnings 
management and return on assets. Thus, more profitable firms are less engaged in earnings 
management, which confirms the results of Bédard et al. (2004) and Habbash (2013). Finally, 
no relationship is found between the voluntary establishment of an executive committee and 
earnings management proxies. 
6. Conclusion 
The objective of our study is to examine the impact of multiple directorships held by board 
members on earnings management measured by discretionary accruals and real earnings 
management. We find that real earnings management is more likely to occur in companies 
whose boards include more directors with multiple board appointments. Our findings largely 
support calls for limits on the number of directorships held by board members. Our study 
suggests that the number of external appointments held by corporate directors is an important 
variable that has been largely overlooked by prior corporate governance and earnings 
management literature.  
Our findings are of value to Saudi Arabia regulatory agencies such as the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) who seek to improve board effectiveness in listed companies. The CMA 
should consider revising the maximum number of additional directorships to protect 
shareholders’ interests from opportunistic earnings management behavior. The findings of this 
study also imply that shareholders should consider the number of multiple directorships of 
board members before they appoint them. 
Like other studies, this study has some limitations. First, we focus on real earnings 
management through operational decisions. Future research, however, could consider other 
less common methods of real earnings management, such the sale of fixed assets. Second, the 
sample period covers only four (4) years data from the Saudi stock exchange market.   
Future research could examine other corporate governance characteristics which may impact 
real earnings management. Further research could concentrate on the effect of independent 
directors’ cash compensation on real earnings management. Future research can use other 
proxies for multiple directorships such as the number of outside directorships per outside 
director (Jiraporn et al., 2008). It also would be valuable to determine the optimum number of 
multiple directorships that can limit accrual-based earnings management and real earnings 
management.    
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Appendix: Sample Distribution Across Industries 
No. Industry N 
1 Petrochemical indutries 14 
2 Cement 12 
3 Retail 14 
4 Agriculture and food indutries 16 
5 Industrial investment 14 
6 Building and construction 17 
7 Real estate development 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for independent and control variables  
     Mean SD Min Max 
NDIR 1.329 0.898 0 4.545 
     
IND 0.487 0.175 0 1 
     
BSIZE 8.157 1.465 4 11 
     
NUMBBMEET 5.284 2.290 0 19 
     
ACSIZE 3.303 0.531 3 5 
     
NUMBACMEET 5.206 2.267 1 21 
     
EXECCOM 0.576 0.495 0 1 
     
SIZE 
 
7.596 1.515 3.682 12.733 
ROA 
 
LEV 
0.087 
 
0.122 
0.104 
 
0.156 
-0.421 
 
0 
0.490 
 
0.669 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Correlation matrix among independent and control variables 
 NDIR      IND BSIZE NUMBBMEET ACSIZE NUMACMEET SIZE ROA LEV 
NDIR 1         
IND -0.136 1        
BSIZE 0.190* -0.199*         1       
NUMBBMEET -0.108 -0.049 -0.082 1      
ACSIZE 0.002 -0.074 0.368* 0.070 1     
NUMACMEET 0.026 0.017 -0.054 0.243* 0.067 1    
SIZE 0.225* -0.310* 0.462* 0.016 0.395* 0.010 1   
ROA 0.088 -0.195* 0.149 -0.103 -0.035 -0.084 -0.025 1  
LEV 0.111 -0.146 0.179* -0.129 0.204* -0.058 0.621* -0.262* 1 
* Significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Model parameters  
 CFOt/At-1 DISEXPt/At-1 PROD t/At-1 TACC 
1/A t-1 27.387 -1.698 3.263 -11.193 
 (2.04)* (0.57) (0.25) (1.00) 
S t/At-1 0.257  0.766  
 (3.85)***  (11.51)***  
ΔSt/ At-1 -0.020  -0.356 0.065 
 (0.20)  (2.81)** (0.71) 
S t-1/At-1  0.048   
  (4.13)***   
ΔSt-1/ At-1   -0.199  
   (2.09)*  
PPE t/At-1    -0.025 
    (0.79) 
_cons -0.025 0.033 -0.049 0.005 
 (0.69) (6.96)*** (1.85)* (0.16) 
R2 0.50 0.27 0.89 0.33 
N 284 284 189 284 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Significance at the 5% level. 
*** Significance at the 1% level. 
This table reports the estimated parameters in the following regressions: 
CFOit / Ait-1 = β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit /Ait-1] + β3 [∆Salesit /Ait-1] + εit  
DISEXPit/Ait-1 = β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit-1 /Ait-1] + εit 
PRODit/Ait-1 = β1 [1/Ait-1] + β2 [Salesit /Ait-1] + β3 [∆Salesit /Ait-1] + β4 [∆Salesit-1 /Ait-1] + εit  
TACCit / Ait - 1 = α0 + α1 (1/Ait - 1) + β1 (ΔSit /At - 1) + β2 (PPEit/Ait - 1) + εit  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Regression results (using accrual-based earnings management and individual measures of real 
earnings management as dependent variables) 
 RM_CFO (R) RM_DISX (R) RM_PROD RES_ACC 
NDIR 0.031 0.005 0.024 0.007 
 (3.29)*** (1.31) (2.57)** (0.71) 
IND -0.048 0.018 0.057 -0.047 
 (0.95) (0.92) (1.14) (0.93) 
BSIZE 0.009 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 
 (1.34) (1.26) (0.00) (0.24) 
NUMBBMEET 0.006 0.001 0.007 0.005 
 (1.49) (0.51) (1.80)* (1.25) 
ACSIZE -0.013 -0.001 0.002 -0.020 
 (0.75) (0.20) (0.10) (1.19) 
NUMACMEET -0.004 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003 
 (1.00) (1.03) (1.71)* (0.67) 
EXECCOM -0.013 0.002 -0.004 0.027 
 (0.78) (0.31) (0.24) (1.59) 
SIZE -0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.000 
 (0.72) (0.01) (0.44) (0.03) 
ROA -0.453 0.085 -0.175 -0.007 
 (4.87)*** (2.38)** (1.87)* (0.08) 
LEV 0.006 0.030 0.055 0.026 
 (0.08) (1.04) (0.75) (0.35) 
_cons 0.036 0.006 -0.025 0.065 
 (0.47) (0.22) (0.33) (0.86) 
R2 0.15 0.04 0.09 0.03 
N 253 253 177 253 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Significance at the 5% level. 
*** Significance at the 1% level. 
This table reports the estimated parameters in the following regressions: 
    RM_CFO (R) it = a0 + a1NDIRit + a2INDit + a3BSIZEit + a4NUMBBMEETit + a5ACSIZEit  
                                  +   a6NUMACMEETit + a7EXECCOMit + a8SIZEit + a9ROAit + a10LEVit+ εit      
     RM_DISX (R) it = a0 + a1NDIRit + a2INDit + a3BSIZEit + a4NUMBBMEETit + a5ACSIZEit  
                                    +   a6NUMACMEETit + a7EXECCOMit + a8SIZEit + a9ROAit + a10LEVit+ εit      
                    RM_PRODit = a0 + a1NDIRit + a2INDit + a3BSIZEit + a4NUMBBMEETit + a5ACSIZEit  
                           +   a6NUMACMEETit + a7EXECCOMit + a8SIZEit + a9ROAit + a10LEVit+ εit      
RES_ACCit = a0 + a1NDIRit + a2INDit + a3BSIZEit + a4NUMBBMEETit + a5ACSIZEit  
                          +   a6NUMACMEETit + a7EXECCOMit + a8SIZEit + a9ROAit + a10LEVit+ εit      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5: Regression results (using aggregate measures of real earnings management as dependent 
variables)  
 RM_CD RM_PD RM_CPD 
NDIR 0.337 0.247 0.338 
 (3.27)*** (1.78)* (2.20)** 
IND -0.004 0.895 0.779 
 (0.01) (1.18) (0.93) 
BSIZE 0.002 -0.057 0.016 
 (0.03) (0.58) (0.15) 
NUMBBMEET 0.060 0.112 0.133 
 (1.42) (1.90)* (2.04)** 
ACSIZE -0.126 -0.086 -0.124 
 (0.68) (0.35) (0.45) 
NUMACMEET -0.060 -0.123 -0.141 
 (1.45) (1.95)* (2.03)** 
EXECCOM -0.061 -0.025 -0.109 
 (0.33) (0.10) (0.40) 
SIZE -0.047 -0.021 -0.083 
 (0.50) (0.16) (0.58) 
ROA -1.759 0.454 -2.052 
 (1.70)* (0.32) (1.32) 
LEV 0.664 1.286 1.713 
 (0.81) (1.15) (1.39) 
_cons 0.413 0.022 0.164 
 (0.49) (0.02) (0.13) 
R2 0.07 0.06 0.09 
N 253 177 177 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
** Significance at the 5% level. 
*** Significance at the 1% level. 
This table reports the estimated parameters in the following regressions: 
RM_CDit = a0 + a1NDIRit + a2INDit + a3BSIZEit + a4NUMBBMEETit + a5ACSIZEit  
                      +   a6NUMACMEETit + a7EXECCOMit + a8SIZEit + a9ROAit + a10LEVit+ εit      
RM_PDit = a0 + a1NDIRit + a2INDit + a3BSIZEit + a4NUMBBMEETit + a5ACSIZEit  
                     +   a6NUMACMEETit + a7EXECCOMit + a8SIZEit + a9ROAit + a10LEVit+ εit      
RM_CPDit = a0 + a1NDIRit + a2INDit + a3BSIZEit + a4NUMBBMEETit + a5ACSIZEit  
                        +   a6NUMACMEETit + a7EXECCOMit + a8SIZEit + a9ROAit + a10LEVit+ εit      
 
 
 
